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BackgRound 
The Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act of 2014 
has reopened the land claims process for another five years, 
extending the deadline to 2019. An impact assessment 
commissioned by the Department of Rural Development and 
Land Reform (DRDLR) anticipates that an estimated 397 000 
new claims will be lodged, at a potential outlay of  
R130–179 billion (DRDLR, 2013) – possibly three times  
the cost of the arms deal.
These are expensive and controversial measures. Some see 
them as appropriate and necessary for pro-poor land reform 
while others view them as highly problematic – especially 
members of rural communities whose claims have not been 
settled in the sixteen years since 1998, when the deadline 
for lodging land claims expired. A slow and administratively 
cumbersome process of land restitution has done little to 
support the wider objective of transforming racially-skewed 
patterns of land ownership. Many of the new claims will be 
settled with cash compensation, and thus be even less likely 
to achieve these objectives. The Act is likely to pit claimants 
against one another in overlapping and competing claims,  
and allow unscrupulous traditional leaders opportunities  
to manipulate land claims for their own benefit. 
This policy brief assesses arguments against the Act and 
recommends measures to safeguard the land rights of ordinary 
South Africans, including those who have already been  
waiting for so long for their claims to be addressed, in a  
context where new restitution claims open many opportunities 














The sTaTe of ResTiTuTion 
 
The land restitution programme was initiated in 1994, and was 
designed to provide redress for dispossession and contribute 
to wider rural transformation. By the initial 1998 cut-off date, 
63 455 claims were lodged, but this was revised to 79 696 
by 2007 (Hall, 2010). Government claims that 97% of these 
claims have been settled, but this is misleading.
The progress of restitution has been very slow 
Of the total claims ‘settled’, 20 592 had yet to be ‘finalised’ and 
fully implemented by August 2013. Another 1 507 gazetted 
claims had not been settled, and a further 7 226 had not yet 
been gazetted (Gobodo, 2013). If all of the latter are indeed 
gazetted, this would mean that 37% of claims remain to be 
fully implemented – 20 years after restitution was begun. 
most rural claims have not yet been resolved 
The great majority (87%) of settled claims have been 
urban, with between R17 500 and R50 000 paid out as 
compensation in most cases. Single rural claims often involve 
large groups of people, and are often much more complex and 
expensive than urban claims. 
The budget for restitution is in decline 
The limited budget for restitution granted to the DRDLR by 
Treasury has constrained implementation, and has decreased 
by more than half since 2008. There is now a large backlog of 
payments due, and Treasury projects no increase in the coming 
years. This means that new claims will compete both with the 
settled claims that are still to be implemented, and also with 
the old claims that are not yet settled.
Restitution has not contributed to any 
significant degree to transforming rural  
south africa 
Largely because of poor implementation, many restitution 
projects have been beset with problems, and their impacts on 
improving livelihoods have been weak. Little support has been 
provided for land-owning Communal Property Associations 
(CPAs) or Trusts, and these have often foundered. Support 
for smallholder farming as an option has not been provided, 
and subdivision of large properties has not been allowed. 
Where transfers of large areas of highly productive land have 
occurred, government has favoured business models such as 
joint ventures between claimants and a private sector ‘strategic 
partner’. These do not allow claimants to live on or use their 
land themselves. Some of these cases have resulted in endemic 
conflict between the partners, while ‘successful’ cases have 
seen a few actual benefits to claimants (such as preferential 
selection for limited employment opportunities, sometimes at 
the cost of existing farm workers), but very few instances of 
dividends being paid (Lahiff et al, 2012).
poTenTiaL impacTs  
of The amendmenT acT
 
Government claims that reopening restitution will help to 
reverse ‘the legacy of poverty, unemployment and inequality’ 
(Nkwinti, 2013). But it is unlikely to do so, for the following 
reasons:
1.   Most of the land claims lodged since the passing of the 
Amendment Act in 2014 have requested cash compensation 
rather than restoration of land ownership (SAPA, 2014). 
While cash payments can be a meaningful form of redress 
for individuals, they do not contribute meaningfully to rural 
or urban transformation. Are many people seeing land claims 
against government as a cash cow? Will there also be a large 
number of new urban land claims asking for cash and making 
demands on limited government funds? Both these scenarios 
are likely to be true. 
2.   At current rates it could take over 100 years to finalise 
the new claims. The Amendment Act threatens to replicate, on 
a vastly larger scale, the experience of claimants in the 37% 
of land claims, who have waited since 1998 for their claims 
to be finalised. At the Commission for the Restitution of Land 
Rights’s average rate of resolving 2 949 claims a year, it will 
take government 144 years to complete restitution. Yet it is by 
no means clear that Treasury will in fact allocate funds of the 
order of magnitude required for this.
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3.   Current policies constrain land restoration. A court ruling 
in Baphiring Community v Tshwaranani Projects CC (2013) 
indicates that government will determine the ‘feasibility’ of land 
restoration as dependent on its cost. Considerations of whether 
or not current agricultural activities will be disrupted, and 
whether or not the state can provide sufficient support  
for resettlement and/or production, will also affect decisions 
on ‘feasibility’ (Centre for Law & Society, 2013). With financial 
support now tied to the Recapitalisation and Development 
Fund, claimants will need to show evidence that they will  
be ‘productive’, must develop costly ‘business plans’, and  
find mentors or ‘strategic partners’ (DRDLR, 2013). In the 
absence of these, they are unlikely to be granted restoration  
of their land. 
4.   Restitution can now include claims against ‘betterment’ 
(i.e. land use) planning in the former Bantustans, which 
resulted in widespread loss of land from the 1950s to the 
1980s. Settling betterment claims through cash payments 
makes no impact on the racially skewed and highly 
concentrated distribution of land ownership in South Africa. 
Well illustrated by the Cata claim (see box), the restitution 
programme is an administratively cumbersome and time-
consuming vehicle for local economic development in 
communal areas (De Wet and Mgujulwa, 2010). Betterment 
claims are anticipated to comprise a third of all new claims. 
5.   Where land restoration is chosen by claimants, the Act 
threatens to initiate a conflictual process of people claiming 
and counter-claiming the same portions of land. Submissions 
to government suggest that some new claimants will contest 
the rights of existing claimants. Government rejected proposals 
that, when reopening claims, the older claims should be 
protected against new counter-claims and should be resolved 
first. Instead, the Act includes a vague statement about 
‘prioritising’ these claims.
6.   The Act has prompted competing claims to ownership 
of vast territories of land by traditional leaders and Khoisan 
groups, based on assertions of nineteenth-century tribal 
boundaries. These threaten existing property rights holders, 
including land reform and restitution beneficiaries, with no 
mechanisms on the table at present for securing their tenure. 
Statements by President Zuma have encouraged traditional 
leaders to lodge claims, including pre-1913 claims, despite 
their current illegality, and the Minister of Rural Development 
and Land Reform, Gugile Nkwinti, has stated that CPAs 
will not be allowed within communal areas, since this will 
create ‘communities within communities’, which implicitly 
endorses apartheid definitions of ‘tribes’ as the only ‘traditional 
communities’ that count (Claassens, 2014). There is evidence 
that the Ingonyama Trust in KwaZulu-Natal and traditional 
councils in North West Province and elsewhere are being used 
to support the private accumulation strategies of powerful 
chiefs and their allies, and land restitution claims could be a 
means to similar ends (iAfrica.com, 2014; Custom Contested, 
2014).
WhaT can Be done?
 
Given that the Amendment Act is now law, and that its repeal 
in the short term is extremely unlikely, it is imperative that its 
potential for negative impacts be reduced. The Commission 
for the Restitution of Land Rights should institute safeguards 
to protect the rights of existing land claimants, as well as 
new claimants located within the jurisdictions of traditional 
leaders. Parliament should enact regulations to effect these 
safeguards. We also recommend that an amendment to the 
Amendment Act be considered, which reduces the time frame 
for new claims from five years to a shorter period, so that the 
period of uncertainty for existing claimants is reduced.
The commission should also consider  
the following recommendations:
1.   Ring-fence existing land claims and finalise their 
implementation prior to settling new claims.
2.   Expedite transfers of restored land to successful 
claimants within 12 months of settlement.
3.   Fulfil government’s legal obligations to the CPAs and 
Trusts to which land has been awarded, providing effective 
support to and oversight of all existing CPAs and Trusts holding 
land on behalf of successful claimant groups.
CATA BETTERMENT ClAIM
The Cata claim in the Eastern Cape is a rare case where 
restitution was awarded to communal area residents for 
loss of land under ‘betterment’ (land use) planning under 
apartheid. Claimants accepted cash compensation, half 
of which is reserved for ‘development’ projects, with 
substantial implementation support from NGOs. 
After more than a decade, implementation has stalled. 
The operation of irrigation and public works projects 
has been intermittent, with community factions and 
traditional leaders challenging both the authority of the 
elected CPA and the original ‘50/50’ grant allocation. 
Government has not defended the CPA, and has failed to 
transfer title to land to the CPA despite a court order to do 
so by 13 May 2013.
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4.   Restitution must be granted to the people who lost land 
and not to those who claim jurisdiction over their land, such as 
chiefs and traditional councils.
5.   Where land is restored, successful claimants should have 
title awarded to the institution of their choice.
6.   Successful claimants must be provided with 
developmental support from diverse funding streams for 
different land uses, rather than discretionary ‘recapitalisation’ 
funds for market-oriented farming alone; this is inappropriate 
within rights-based claims to restitution.
7.   Provide a fully detailed Strategic and Operational Plan 
to improve the Commission’s institutional capacity and secure 
appropriate budgets for the extended time frame of restitution.
concLusion
 
The Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act of 2014 is 
an ill-conceived and poorly planned intervention that could 
undermine the rights of existing land claimants. Its main 
political rationale appears to be vote-catching and political 
theatre, not meaningful rural change. It is unlikely to  
contribute positively to post-apartheid rural transformation.  
If the 12 000 land claims lodged in the first two months  
of its life are anything to go by, most claims will be for cash 
payouts, either for land lost under ‘betterment’ planning in 
communal aeas, or in urban areas. The Act will likely open 
the floodgates to hundreds of thousands of requests for 
cash compensation, but contribute little to local economic 
development, infrastructural improvement or investment in 
new job-creating activities – reconfiguring the economy that 
government policies should be focused on. 
Urgently required now are safeguards for the rights of existing 
land claimants, and fulfilment of government’s obligations to 
the land-holding entities established by successful claimants. 
Most importantly, government needs to review its ineffective 
land redistribution programme, and then use it to drive broader 
transformation in South Africa’s rural areas.
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